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Introduction 
Since the Russian annexation of Crimea and fomentation of war in 
southeastern Ukraine in 2014, the United States and their allies in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have sanctioned and isolated 
Russia on the international stage.1 The international backlash against the 
Russian Federation’s projection of hard power in neighboring Ukraine has 
left the Russian Federation to foster or reinvigorate relationships with 
countries elsewhere around the world. This power projection has been 
perceived differently in the West and in Russia. In the West, Russia’s 
recent geopolitical moves have been seen as acts of aggression.2 Russia 
sees the moves as a reaction to the decline of the United States as the 
global hegemon and a natural return to multipolarity, or “polycentrism” 
by Russian experts in international relations.3 Kortunov argues that Russia 
should continue on its path to reasserting itself as a global leader and 
decision maker, but argues that Russia should do so via the further 
development of soft power and fomenting better international diplomacy.4 
Kortunov also mentions Moscow’s presence in Latin America and 
questions whether Russia should focus on the leftist regimes that are 
hostile to the West there or focus on repairing its own relationship with 
the West.  
 
Kortunov’s mention of the Russian presence in Latin America is key as this 
could be a flashpoint between Russia and the United States just as the 
Eastern expansion of NATO has been. The focus of international 
interaction between Russia and Latin America since 2000 has been on 
energy ventures and arms sales. However, the international backlash over 
Russian intervention in Ukraine led Russian President Putin to schedule 
an international tour in Latin American countries in the summer of 2014.5 
The countries where this is demonstrated the clearest are Cuba, Nicaragua, 
and Venezuela, which admittedly have long standing ties with Moscow, 
but President Putin’s 2014 tour also included Mexico and Brazil, which 
have not historically has been as close to Russia as the other states.6 With 
mention of Russia in Latin America, what are the possible effects of this 
presence? Through a country case approach, this article seeks to analyze 
Russia’s presence in Latin America since 2000 to answer this question. 
Before beginning the country case approach, historical context is needed 
to better understand the American and Russian spheres of influence, 
Russia’s kinetic presence in Ukraine and now even Syria, as well as the 
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threat of a regional flashpoint in Latin American between the United 
States and Russia. It is the conclusion of this article that the current 
geopolitical standoff between Russia and the United States is witnessing a 
revisionist Russia attempting to undermine U.S. global hegemonic power, 
which also includes the attempt of undermining U.S. influence in Latin 
America. 
 
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union established 
territorial zones of states geographically close to them and worked to 
expand their influence from these zones to each other’s zones or 
establishing this idea of conflicting spheres of influence. During that 
conflict, these zones were Western Europe and Eastern Europe, loyal to 
the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. These two 
superpowers had additional zones in close geographic proximity: Latin 
America to the United States and Central Asia to the Soviet Union. These 
latter zones are the result of centuries of conquest and political dominance 
by the bigger powers. While Central Asia and Russia have been entwined 
much longer, the case of Latin America, the establishment of this 
American sphere of influence dates back to the fifth American President: 
James Monroe. President James Monroe established the Monroe 
Doctrine, which outlined American intent that Europe would stay out of 
the Western Hemisphere.7 Since then, the main incursions have been from 
the Soviet Union: The predecessor state to the Russian Federation. That 
was the Cold War: however, there are arguments that the United States 
and its allies are once again engaged in a Cold War with the Russian 
Federation.8 If the United States and its allies are to prevail in this new 
conflict, it will have to maintain its longstanding Monroe Doctrine and 
entice its partners in Latin America to continue looking towards 
Washington and not Moscow. 
 
Though it appears that Russia is infringing upon the U.S. sphere of 
influence, this may not be unprecedented as the United States did the 
same at the end of the Cold War. To conclude the Cold War, U.S. Secretary 
of State James Baker declared to Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, “If we 
maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of NATO, there would be 
no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the 
east.”9 However, since that conversation (February 1990), NATO has 
grown to include the former Warsaw Pact (Eastern European) countries of 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, 
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Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Montenegro while also including the 
former Soviet satellite nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.10 The 
significance of this enlargement is that NATO now encroaches on the 
Russian border. This also means that repeated claims from Russian 
President Vladimir Putin that the United States and its Western allies have 
broken their promise of non-expansion are valid. With NATO 
encroachment on the Russian border, it makes sense then that Russia 
would look to reciprocate actions in the U.S. sphere of influence by 
undermining confidence in relations with the United States on the part of 
countries in Latin America. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Breakup of the Soviet Union and Degradation of Russia 
 
On December 25, 1991, the Flag of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(Soviet Union) descended from its position at the Kremlin for the final 
time.11 The Cold War had finally ended and the struggle between the 
world’s two largest superpowers was finally over. The question of what was 
to come in the post-Cold War world was now arising. While this date 
meant the end of the Soviet Union, it also marked the first time that 
Russians did not have to fear an attack emanating from the West, a stark 
contrast to what the previous century had just threatened Russians. Yet, 
with time, these fears would once again rematerialize. 
 
A year prior, Soviet Premier Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State Baker 
were negotiating on the idea of German reunification. In the West, the idea 
was for the stability of Europe and reunification of German families with 
one another and the peaceful reintegration of Germany into Europe. The 
Soviet perspective was to ensure that a reunified Germany would not mean 
a renewed threat to the Russian people, as it had it with World War I and 
World War II. Yet this fear of an invasion from the West was warranted 
from merely observing the German invasions in the 20th century, Russia 
has experienced invasions for the last thousand years.12 That is why so 
many would have been interested in the negotiations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union over this reunification. 
 
Secretary Baker seemed to understand this as well. In that telegram to 
Premier Gorbachev, he also reiterated, “would you prefer a united 
Shuya: Russian Influence in Latin America: a Response to NATO
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
20 
Germany outside of NATO that is independent and has no US forces or 
would you prefer a united Germany with ties to NATO and assurances that 
there would be no extension of NATO’s current jurisdiction eastward?”13 
Germany would eventually reunite by the end of 1990.14 The 1990’s would 
come to a close and see countries formerly loyal to Moscow join both the 
European Community and NATO as the military alliance slowly moved 
east while Russia fell into ruin and would have to rebuild itself once more. 
 
Country Cases 
 
Ukraine 
 
The origin of this new standoff between Russia and the West has to do 
with the annexation of Crimea and the fomentation of war in and invasion 
of South Eastern Ukraine, in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, 
known as the Donbass. In late 2013 and early 2014, protests erupted in the 
Ukrainian capital as then President Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign 
international accords that would have moved Ukraine closer to Western 
Europe and away from Russia. The protests eventually saw Yanukovych 
ousted, but the Ukrainian territory of Crimea invaded and annexed by 
Russia through an illegitimate parliamentary referendum on annexation.15 
Following this illegitimate annexation, war broke out in another region of 
Ukraine, the Donbass, which has been another point of contention 
between the United States and the Russian Federation. The Western view 
is that the faction fighting the Ukrainian government, styled as 
“separatists” are actually Russian forces. These Russian forces, specifically 
Special Forces, are being deployed in unmarked uniforms and using other 
means to conceal their Russian identity. When Ukraine capture a small 
contingent of these soldiers in the southeastern part of the country, the 
soldiers stated that they were on holiday, but that refusal to fight meant 
prison terms for disobeying orders.16 In a joint press conference with U.S. 
Secretary of State John Kerry, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk stated,  
 
“It seems to me that the only country who strongly deny clear 
military Russian boots on the ground is Russian Federation and 
personally President Putin. If they need, I can give them my glasses. 
While crystal clear that Russian military is on the ground, crystal 
clear that it was Russia who invaded Crimea, Russia invaded the 
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east of Ukraine, because frankly, it’s a little bit difficult to buy SA-11 
and SA-22 and Russian tanks and Russian Howitzers and Russian 
artillery at the marketplace in Donetsk or Lugansk. We have strong 
evidences and grounds that Russian Federation violated an 
international law and Russian president ordered Russian troops to 
invade both Crimea and the east of Ukraine. We are not fighting 
with so-called rebels or guerillas. We are fighting with the Russian 
regular army.”17 
 
Secretary of State Kerry, for his part seemed to support Prime Minister 
Yatsenyuk’s statement with,  
 
“Let me add to that that social media is filled with comment – and 
on occasion, photos – of Russian soldiers being returned to Russia 
dead, and parents in Russia being told a lie that their children, their 
sons, died in an accident somewhere. And there are other stories. I 
won’t go into them at great length now except to say to you that 
there are intercepts of conversations of orders being given by 
people who are discernibly Russian. There are references – there’s a 
person in captivity today who has recently given evidence of his 
own role with respect to these kinds of decisions. So enough is 
enough.”18 
 
Russia still denies any involvement in sponsoring the war in southeastern 
Ukraine. In April of 2016, President Putin stated that Russia was intent on 
restoring peace in Ukraine, but that it was facing sanctions and 
international backlash from the West, that it was, in fact, the victim of 
Western aggression.19 This is in stark contrast to President Barack 
Obama’s statement that, “Russia encourages the violence, trains, and arms 
the separatists. They are funded by Russia.”20 In 2018, following in the 
footsteps of President Obama, the Trump White House released its 
position that Russia “invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014” and 
continued by announcing further support for the Ukrainian government’s 
armed forces.21 
 
In November of 2018, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed, “On 
the Introduction of Martial Law in Ukraine" in retaliation for “wide-scale 
invasion of Ukraine by the Russian armed forces” and an attack on 
Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait.22 In February of 2019, 
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President Poroshenko also publicly announced his desires for Ukraine to 
join both NATO and the EU. He explicitly stated, “We know that only 
membership in NATO and the EU, which will ensure a strong development 
of democracy and the rule of law, economy, and living standards of 
Ukraine, can guarantee peace and freedom to Ukraine, as well as to all the 
neighbors of Russia.”23 To date, the conflict has seen over 10,000 deaths 
and over 1.3 million people displaced from their homes. 
 
Syria 
 
The United States has been in Syria since the start of the conflict. The most 
drastic event involving U.S. forces was the 2018 airstrike on Syrian 
military assets. President Trump declared, “My fellow Americans, a short 
time ago, I ordered the United States Armed Forces to launch precision 
strikes on targets associated with the chemical weapons capabilities of 
Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.”24 Russia entered the Syrian Civil War, in 
2015, in defense of the Bashar Al-Assad Regime, albeit if officially to “fight 
international terrorism.”25 Russia’s military presence in Syria was 
designated as limited to air operations (with no mention of the exclusion 
of Special Forces).26 In 2016, Reuters reported that Russian forces were 
exceeding their declared presence in Syria by using private military 
contractors.27 The presence of these military contractors, or “mercenaries” 
in common usage, would also become important when kinetically 
engaging U.S. forces. 
 
The direct contact between Russian and American forces came in the form 
of a firefight when Russia’s “little green men” aided pro-Assad forces 
contact the Syrian Democratic Forces, who happened to be assisted by U.S. 
Special Forces.28 The Pentagon did not state the presence of the Russian 
forces in the pro-Assad attack in an immediate release, but in a New York 
Times article two months later, it appears that the Pentagon did admit to 
this.29 The New York Times article claims that the pro-Assad and Russian 
force sustained 200-300 casualties while the United States backed Syrian 
Democratic Forces sustained no casualties. Additionally, in 2018, the 
White House released a briefing, which stated that Russia was continuing 
to exacerbate the Syrian Civil War in support of Assad.30 
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Cuba 
 
Russia and Cuba have maintained close relations since Fidel Castro’s turn 
toward the Soviet Union in 1960. This relationship would witness the 
Cuban Missile Crisis where the Soviet Union placed missiles in Cuba and 
played host to the event marking the closest direct confrontation between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. However, the official Russian 
presence in Cuba ended in 2002 when the Russian Federation closed its 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) base at Lourdes.31 This was due to budgetary 
concerns and the belief that overseas bases would be too expensive for the 
Russian military. In 2012, President Putin decided that Russia needed to 
refocus on its military capabilities and capacity to project power.32 
President Putin specifically stated,  
 
“Our goal is to expand Russia’s presence on the global arms 
and military equipment market. This means expanding the number 
of countries we sell to, and expanding the range of goods 
and services we offer.”  
 
In 2015, General John Kelly of U.S. Southern Command stated that: 
 
“Periodically since 2008, Russia has pursued an increased presence 
in Latin America through propaganda, military arms and 
equipment sales, counterdrug agreements, and trade. Under 
President Putin, however, we have seen a clear return to Cold War-
tactics as part of its global strategy. Russia is using power projection 
in an attempt to erode U.S. leadership and challenge U.S. influence 
in the Western Hemisphere. Last year and again this year, a 
Russian intelligence ship docked in Havana multiple times while 
conducting operations in the Gulf of Mexico and along the east 
coast of the United States. Russia has courted Cuba, Venezuela, and 
Nicaragua to gain access to air bases and ports for resupply of 
Russian naval assets and strategic bombers operating in the 
Western Hemisphere.”33 
 
Part of what General Kelly’s reference of the Russian naval vessel docking 
in the port of Havana was a culmination of top-state officials, including the 
President and Minister of Defense, to Cuba, searching for agreements that 
would enhance bilateral relations. President Vladimir Putin visited Cuba 
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in July of 2014, where he told reporters that renewing Russia’s presence 
and commitment to Latin America was a top foreign policy initiative.34 
Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu also visited Cuba, but earlier 
that year.35 The official story from the Russian Ministry of Defense was 
that Shoigu’s visit was to negotiate issues of security with Cuban leader 
Raul Castro. Julia Gurganus, of the Carnegie Endowment Center, posited 
that this visit was more so about establishing Russian access to ports and 
airfields of nations within Latin America.36 While not immediately likely, 
there also remains the possibility that this cooperation will one day 
culminate in the re-opening of the SIGINT base at Lourdes. 
 
Nicaragua 
 
The Russian government has also successfully curbed its influence in 
Nicaragua. In 2014, on the same tour as the meeting with Cuba (as well as 
Argentina and Brazil), President Putin and Nicaraguan President Ortega 
discussed agriculture related trade, expansion of Russian oil projects into 
Nicaragua, and a security agreement that would allow for Russian 
intelligence equipment to be stationed in Nicaragua.37 In the official 
remarks following that meeting, President Ortega referenced already 
benefiting from the fruits of Russian investment into his country and even 
told President Putin, “This is the first time a Russian President visits 
Nicaragua. We are happy to welcome you in our country. Please consider it 
your country.”38 In that same statement, President Ortega also declared 
that there were fraternal relations between Russia and Nicaragua. A 
further security agreement between the two countries was announced in 
2018.39 Sergey Sukhankin of the Jamestown Foundation assessed this 
agreement to be grounded in military assistance, para-military assistance, 
cooperation with information warfare, and interest in a canal that would 
mirror the Panama Canal, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.40 
The military assistance to Nicaragua has included supply of tanks, light 
fighter jets, helicopters, and boats and is said to supply 90 percent of 
Nicaragua’s arms’ needs. Data from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) indicates that Russia has provided Nicaragua 
with 128 million units worth of arms since the year 2000 and supports the 
statistic on arms’ needs.41 This assistance in Nicaragua from Russia is 
vehemently welcomed as the United States is condemning and sanctioning 
the country for abuses against students, journalists, and clergy members.42 
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Venezuela 
 
Russia’s interest in Venezuela lies with the opportunity of investment that 
Venezuela has provided in the 21st Century. Under the leadership of Hugo 
Chavez, Venezuela was an Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) powerhouse.43 Venezuela also began purchasing large amounts of 
arms from Russia as well as working out lucrative energy contracts with 
Russian firms. In 2006, Gazprom won a bid to explore oil deposits within 
Venezuelan waters while $4 billion arms’ deal was successfully negotiated 
between the two countries.44 The transition of power from Chavez to his 
successor, Nicolas Maduro, would not reflect the prestige of this oil rich 
nation. Under Maduro, Venezuela would further tie itself to Russia by 
receiving loans from Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil company, which is also 
used to leverage soft power with Russian foreign policy.45 The massive 
debts that Venezuela owes are increasing, and political stability of the 
country is in jeopardy. The year 2019 has proven to be the most dangerous 
year in recent memory regarding Venezuela.  
 
In January of 2019, Venezuelan Congressional leader Juan Guaido 
declared himself President, refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
Nicolas Maduro’s victory in the election.46 In early February, the United 
States State Department, under the lead of Secretary of State Pompeo, 
backed Guaido’s claim and recognized him as the legitimate President of 
Venezuela.47 The United States also formed a coalition of countries 
recognizing Guaido, including the European Union, but not the Russian 
Federation. Russia decided to back Maduro and violence has since broken 
out in reaction to the split in government. In February, President Maduro 
closed the borders of Venezuela with Brazil and Colombia, attempting to 
stop international aid from entering the country.48 The response has been 
injuries and deaths of citizens along both borders as well as the defection 
of hundreds of Venezuelan troops to the opposition government, operating 
out of Colombia.49 The United States has shown interest in deploying 
troops to Colombia, near the border.50 Russia has sent private military 
contractors to shore up the Maduro regime in the case of civil war.51 
 
Brazil 
 
In economic terms, Brazil is one of the two major Latin American 
countries for Russian trade (the other being Mexico) and engages in 
Shuya: Russian Influence in Latin America: a Response to NATO
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
26 
discussion with Russia via the BRICS forum (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
South Africa).52 Bilateral relations between Russia and Brazil have been 
strong since 2000, beginning with “the Basic Agreement on Partnership 
Relations”, visits from President Vladimir Putin to Brazil in 2004 and 
President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva visiting Russia in 2005 in efforts to 
sign the "Strategic Partnership Action Plan", and a visa waiver agreement 
in 2008. 53 In the 2010’s, both Russia and Brazil have stressed the 
importance of future development of cooperation.54 In 2014, President 
Vladimir Putin traveled to Brazil once more for the official BRICS summit, 
in which the “Fortaleza Declaration and Action Plan” had been signed.55 
President Putin specifically mentioned that a series of commercial 
agreements in a variety of sectors had been agreed, and that economic 
development had consistently increased between the two countries.56 In 
2017, Brazilian President Michel Temer visited Russia to negotiate a series 
of acts including: International dialogue between their respective foreign 
ministries, an agreement between these two ministries from 2018-2021, a 
memorandum of understanding between respective ministries regarding 
trade, and regarding tariffs between Brazil and the Eurasian Economic 
Union.57 Russian-Brazilian relations have focused on economics and 
finance, energy, defense, science and technology, agriculture, culture, 
education and sports. 
 
Bilateral trade between Russia and Brazil was worth $6.8 billion in 2014, 
following the BRICS summit, while trade between Russia and the United 
States was worth $62.5 billion for the same year.58 Bilateral trade between 
Russia and Brazil amounted to $5.4 billion in 2017 while bilateral trade 
between the United States and Brazil was 10 times that amount at $52.3 
billion.59 Russia also has tried to flaunt its defense agreements with Brazil, 
but arms trade between the two countries have only amounted to 4.1 
percent of all arms imports to Brazil since 2000.60 During this same 
period, the United States has supplied 18.13 percent of arms to Brazil, 
falling behind Russia only twice during that period: 2010 and 2015. The 
other major target for Russia in Latin America is Mexico. 
 
Mexico 
 
Perhaps the biggest worry for the Russian advances of influence to Latin 
America should be the United States’ southern neighbor: Mexico. During 
his tenure, President Putin has met with two of his Mexican counterparts: 
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Vicente Fox and Enrique Pena Nieto. In 2004, the Kremlin released 
President Putin’s view that Russia, at that time, did not have the resources 
to give Latin America the same attention that its predecessor, the Soviet 
Union, had been able to during the Cold War. The press release specifically 
mentioned Mexico as a possible starting point, following a phone 
conversation between Presidents Vicente Fox and Vladimir Putin.61 In 
2005, before Russia’s inclusion in the World Trade Organization, 
Presidents Putin and Fox met to discuss signing bilateral agreements on 
suitability between their respective aviation ministries, energy sector 
cooperation between their respective energy ministries, agreements 
between their respective health ministries, and collaboration on mutual 
legal assistance to criminal cases.62 The Russian Embassy to Mexico has 
also maintained an extensive history of the bilateral relationship between 
the two countries. According to their records, 2008 saw increased 
cooperation between the two countries in combatting organized crime, 
terrorism, and struggles against climate change.63 Their records also 
indicate that an agreement of bilateral cooperation between the Russian 
Federation Council and the Mexican Senate was formalized in 2013.64 
Four years later, in 2017, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto met with 
President Vladimir Putin and the two discussed the increase in trade 
between the two countries, and the potential for much more.65 
 
Although this rhetoric and sets of exchanges would indicate a great deal of 
collaboration, Richard Miles of the Center for Strategic International 
Studies (CSIS) indicates the opposite. Miles actually argues that data 
shows that total trade between Mexico and the Russian Federation totaled 
$1.7 billion in 2016, or the equivalency of 39 hours of trade between the 
United States and Mexico.66 Moreover, while Russia mainly sees 
opportunities for trading with Mexico via arms, data is also not in their 
favor. The data from SIPRI’s register shows that total Mexican imports of 
arms since 2000 have been 2,656 million pieces of equipment, with Russia 
totaling 5 percent at 132 million and the United States accounting for 50.9 
percent at 1,353 million pieces.67 The biggest questions that arise are what 
will happen with Mexico’s newest President: Andres Manuel Lopez 
Obrador (AMLO). AMLO is more of a nationalist figure and the first to be 
elected outside the two main parties in over half a century. AMLO has also 
decided to focus the country on projects of infrastructure, including a new 
oil refinery.68 While AMLO has voiced wariness towards the United States, 
his administration did take part in the renegotiation of the North 
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American Free Trade agreement and helped come up with its successor: 
The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), effectively 
continuing the tradition of binding Mexico’s economy to that of the United 
States.69 
 
Other Russian Commitments to the Region 
 
In 2014, the Minister for Defense of Russia, Sergei Shoigu, announced 
commitment to monitoring the Gulf of Mexico with permanent nuclear 
bomber aerial runs and the possibility of establishing military bases in 
Latin America and the Western Hemisphere.70 The type of aircraft capable 
of these missions had not been observed in the area since 2008. However, 
in 2018, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that long-range 
strategic bombers had flown from Russia to airfields in Venezuela.71 It was 
the third noted time since 2008 that these aircraft had landed in 
Venezuela, according to William Courtney at the RAND Corporation.72 
This has also accompanied Russian naval movement in the region. A 
Russian SIGINT ship has been frequently spotted in the area. The Viktor 
Leonov, a Russian Meridian Project 864 reconnaissance vessel, was 
spotted off the coast of the Atlantic Seaboard in 2017.73 The Viktor Leonov 
has patrolled the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico since at least 2015, 
when it sailed from Venezuela to Cuba for training.74 One of the ship’s 
visits to Cuba also coincided with United States-Cuba talks aimed at 
restoring diplomatic relations to those similar to the pre-Cuban Missile 
Crisis era.75 This intelligence gathering ship also had been spotted off 
American coasts numerous times in 2017 and 2018, near Florida, Georgia, 
South Carolina, and Virginia.76 The presence of this ship has been more 
concrete than that of others, including submarines, but the threat of 
submarines remains. 
 
Since Defense Minister Shoigu’s announcement, Russian Admiral Viktor 
Chirkov stated that Russian submarine patrols were up about 50 percent 
from 2013.77 Supporting this claim, General Curtis Scaparrotti of United 
States European Command testified to Congress that Russian naval 
activity, particularly in the submarine environment, is the highest it has 
been since the 1980’s.78 In 2015, the U.S. Navy tracked a Russian 
submarine, the Yantar, down the Atlantic seaboard to Cuba, noticing that 
it was following a path of communications cables and displaying the 
capability of deploying small vessels for cutting such communications, if 
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the need ever arose for that.79 This foreshadowing of Russian national 
defense that magazine editor Igor Korotchenko revealed in 2018: “Our 
submarines, too, might have surfaced suddenly some place in the Gulf of 
Mexico to shock America. We have the corresponding forces of our 
submarine fleet there.”80 This should not be taken lightly, as Russian 
President Vladimir Putin also revealed in February of 2019 that, “I would 
like to make an important statement. We did not announce it before, but 
today we can say that as soon as this spring the first nuclear-powered 
submarine carrying this unmanned vehicle will be launched.”81 The 
announcement was a confirmation of what U.S. Intelligence had reported 
on in 2016: Russia has been working on developing unmanned 
submarines, capable of being deployed thousands of miles from base.82 
These announcements and developments of newer technology are 
attempts at outright hard power projection intended to convey a message 
of parity or near parity to military strength globally. 
 
Analysis 
 
Russia’s presence in Latin America indicates that that they are willing to 
expand their reach in order to form new agreements. International 
economic sanctions have left Russia no choice. The conflict in Ukraine, 
under Russia’s direction, has left them in hostile conflict with the West 
and liberal democracies. Their moves into Syria also indicate a desire to 
establish himself or herself as an important global actor that should be 
consulted, not ignored as they claim that the West has done since the end 
of the Cold War. The conflict in Syria also provides the Russian military 
battlefield experience for its soldiers and the ability to confront American 
soldiers, who have been fighting in the region since 2001. While Russia 
decided to make the move into Syria during the Obama administration, 
they have encountered American forces refusing to back down during the 
Trump administration. 
 
President Trump’s ordering of airstrikes against the Assad regime sent a 
clear message that the United States would no longer allow war crimes 
against civilian populations in the name of the regime. The skirmish 
between Assad and Russian mercenaries with American backed forces and 
American Special Forces also reinforced a refusal to back down to Russia. 
Further encounters between the two militaries might prove to be even 
more dangerous and escalate. Since 2014, President Putin has heightened 
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his rhetoric as to what is considered a threat, and direct confrontation 
between the two countries’ military forces might threaten to work in 
President Putin’s favor should he seek justification for war. 
 
Regarding NATO, President Putin is essentially correct: The promise not 
to expand was broken. This is only at face value, however due to the fact 
that Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter can be interpreted to 
allow such membership.83 Article 51 does not state anything about 
agencies, but is the article that discusses a nation’s right to self-defense. 
The article does stress the event of armed attack. Article 52, however, 
discusses a nation’s right to enter into regional agencies for protection. 
This article then, is essence, justifies the positions of former Warsaw Pact 
countries wary of Russia turning to NATO membership. Beyond just the 
legal framework, it is important to remember that once the Soviet Union 
fell, the former Soviet Union and its partner states in Eastern Europe 
underwent a period of chaos. For many of the countries who eventually 
went on to join NATO, the structure provided by Western institutions, 
such as security with NATO and economic reform with the European 
Union, was a way to get back on track and reassert some sort of national 
identity. This unexpected expansion of NATO towards the territories that 
President Bush had once promised would not happen came unexpectedly 
and not without repercussions. 
 
What should be extremely alarming about this increase in Russian 
influence across Latin America is Russia’s ability to export advanced 
weaponry on as wide a scale as the United States. Latin America 
specifically has had a violent history in the past century, fueled with 
weaponry provided by both the United States and the Soviet Union (now 
Russia). SIPRI lists the United States and Russia as the world’s two 
leading exporters of arms (in that order).84 The new security agreement 
with Nicaragua would also imply a further reliance on Russian weaponry. 
Allowing Russian SIGINT equipment into Nicaragua, as well as discussing 
the possibilities of a new trans-ocean canal, would mean further 
dependence on Russia. This also might cause problems for U.S. Southern 
Command (SOUTHCOM) operating in Central America knowing that a 
contingent of Russians based in the area is constantly monitoring them. 
Venezuela is also creating cause for concern. 
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The government of Nicolas Maduro is already heavily in debt to Russian 
companies and the Russian state itself. The instability that has occurred in 
early 2019 is increasing the possibilities for violence daily. Should civil war 
officially break out in Venezuela, it remains to be seen whether the United 
States and Russia will be willing to back opposing sides, as has been the 
case in Syria. Possibly, the difference would be that Russia would have had 
a presence in the country since the beginning of the conflict, not years into 
as was the case in Syria. This possibly indicates a greater willingness to 
protect the Maduro regime and the current government of Venezuela. 
Should this be the case, it will also depend on whether U.S. President 
Donald Trump and his administration are prepared for such an event. In 
2017, President Trump had stated “I’m not going to rule out a military 
option. We have many options for Venezuela.”85 This issue was brought up 
again in January 2019 (following the beginning of the unrest) at a White 
House Press Conference. Acting Chief of Staff, Mick Mulvaney, told 
journalists that the President is looking at all options, and that "I don't 
think any president of any party who is doing his or her job would be doing 
the job properly if they took anything off the table.”86 The possibilities of 
such escalations have only increased after the Maduro regime ordered U.S. 
diplomats to leave Venezuela, following accusations that the U.S. 
government was responsible for a power blackout that has left the 
country’s infrastructure vulnerable.87 This order, from Caracas, came a day 
following Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s announcement that the State 
Department was withdrawing all personnel from the U.S. Embassy in 
Caracas.88 
 
Focusing on the region at large, the Russian government stated in its 2016 
Foreign Policy Concept that it was intent on increasing bilateral 
cooperation with Latin American states by targeting regional economic 
associations and projects.89 The multiple cooperation agreements signed 
between Russia and these countries since 2000 would support this claim. 
However, trade data from the United Nations shows that these countries 
maintain much stronger economic ties with the United States than with 
the Russian Federation. In some instances, this trade is valued at 10 times 
the value than that between these countries and the Russian Federation. 
This analysis also states that these Latin American countries find it more 
profitable to deal with the American government than the Russian 
government. United Nations trade data actually shows that, even with 
Russia’s three main partners in the region (Cuba, Nicaragua, and 
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Venezuela), trade between these countries and the United States was much 
larger, at times more than double that of the trade between these countries 
and Russia. This also reveals that Russian attempts at increasing their 
foreign influence in the region are not reflected in economic data. The 
empirical data favoring United States trade also provides opportunity. 
 
When asked by a U.S. Senator what he thought of the foreign development 
budget before becoming Secretary of Defense, General James Mattis once 
stated,  
 
“If you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy 
more ammunition ultimately. So, I think –it's a cost benefit ratio. 
The more that we put into the state department's diplomacy, 
hopefully the less we have to put into a military budget.”90 
 
Ultimately, General Mattis’ recommendation of foreign development 
seems logical in this instance. If the United States can work to increase 
infrastructure and economies in the region, just as it has under its counter 
insurgency doctrine, then it is much more plausible that these 
governments would see the United States in a more favorable outlook than 
they previously had.91 This would also possible mean less inclination for 
these countries to look to outside influence, such as that of Russia, for 
economic and political support to achieve national goals. Military actions 
and maneuvers, however, would indicate a slight increase in influence, or 
causes of concern for the United States. 
 
The increase in military co-operation between Russia and Latin American 
countries means that Russia is once again trying to establish a permanent 
military presence in the Western Hemisphere. The use of airfields in 
Venezuela, and the negotiations of airfields elsewhere in the region, is 
allowing Russia to place greater air assets in the region. These negotiations 
are allowing Russia to fulfill its promise of monitoring the Gulf of Mexico 
and Caribbean, as promised by Sergei Shoigu, through the housing of 
assets, which means that fuel and other logistical support would 
accompany these planes to support these missions. The negotiations also 
focused on naval port access for Russian ships. Testimony from Russian 
and American military commanders indicates that Russian naval activity 
has greatly increased. Strategic access to ports in Cuba and Nicaragua 
would also mean shorter trips for reconnaissance missions of American 
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coastlines in intelligence gathering operations. Cuba provides easy access, 
but Nicaragua would be attractive due to the positioning of other SIGINT 
assets. The presence of the Viktor Leonov might also indicate a willingness 
to make visits to Nicaragua and corroborate other intelligence gathered 
from inside the country or collaborate on targeting of American military 
and intelligence resources in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
The Russian submarine drones could also possibly raise the likelihood of 
these types of operations. This is because of the existence of narco-
submarines, or low-profile vessels, that have been used by Latin American 
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) since the 1990’s.92 These 
narco-submarines have been a nuisance to the U.S. Coast Guard as their 
smaller size allows greater stealth in transporting illicit narcotics and other 
contraband to American coastal waters. The Russian submarine drones 
sound similar to these narco-submarines, but with far more advanced 
technology and capabilities than those used by TCOs. It is also possible 
that the countries of Latin America are just as aware of their presence as 
the U.S. government. It is also quite possible that these countries may 
suggest similar use of the Russian submarine drones as the narco-
submarines, sending them along similar paths to conduct intelligence 
missions and surveil U.S. military and intelligence capabilities, such as the 
naval base at King’s Bay in Georgia (as the Viktor Leonov has in the past). 
 
Implications 
 
The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization towards Russian 
borders has been perceived by Russia as a violation of trust that was 
agreed upon in the dying days of the Cold War. This has also led to a state 
where countries that once favored Russia have turned to the West and the 
United States. Russia’s actions in Ukraine, in 2014, were intended to send 
a message to these countries to comply with Russian influence as the 
status quo. The backlash of these actions has been the international 
isolation of Russia and set the stage for what appears to be a new Cold War 
between Russia and the West. In retaliation for seemingly undermining 
Russian influence in Europe, Russia has turned to countries of Central and 
South America to foment new relationships, in an attempt to do the same 
in countries that have traditionally fallen under American influence. 
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This has been especially evident in Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Brazil, 
and Mexico, where Russia has shown intent on re-establishing a Russian 
presence since 2000. The establishment of bilateral agreements, ranging 
from economic agreements and defense agreements to scientific and 
healthcare collaboration agreements, has set a precedent that Russia is 
trying to influence these nations under the guise of assistance covertly. 
Announcements from the Russian government would indicate the success 
of these agreements, yet trade data from the United Nations does not 
support this idea. Russia has been much more successful in terms of 
defense co-operation with these countries, having negotiated access to 
naval ports, airfields, and placing intelligence resources within strategic 
locations. This has also left a wide range of implications regarding Russia’s 
presence in the region. 
 
The first implication would be that Russia is looking to take advantage of 
historical distrust of the United States in the region. American 
condemnation and sanctioning of specific governments in the area, 
coupled with the recent issues in Venezuela, threaten to bring memories of 
U.S. support for coups and regime changes in Latin America back to life. 
With Venezuela, American and Russian support for opposing factions 
threatens to divide the country violently along similar lines to that of Syria 
in the Middle East, where both countries are also involved in supporting 
opposing factions. The expulsion of American diplomats from the region, 
and the Maduro regime’s historic dependence on Russia, could also lead to 
further calls of support from Russia, including delivery of more arms and 
weapons of war. The handling of this conflict will also inevitably shape 
how other countries in the region view both the United States and Russia 
and will shape their decision of which country to support in the coming 
decades. 
 
The second implication has been addressing the influx of migrants from 
the region to the United States and underlying issues. Nicaragua is one of 
the leading points of origin for these migrants, and President Ortega 
enthusiastically acknowledged Russian investment in infrastructure in the 
country. Venezuela, like Nicaragua, is also heavily dependent on Russia for 
investment of infrastructure. The idea of a new trans-ocean canal in the 
country could lead to other issues as well. Additionally, the growing crisis 
in Venezuela is also, in part, due to this reliance on Russia and increasing 
further public debt. What is being demonstrated is that widespread 
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poverty in the region, related to poor physical and fiscal infrastructure, is 
leading to violent clashes and a mass movement of people towards 
opportunity. If General James Mattis is to be believed, regarding funding, 
then American assistance and stimulation to the region could alleviate this 
motivation for migration as well as lead to better relations in the area, 
incentivizing these traditional American partners to remain partners and 
turn their course of focusing on new relations with Russia or other outside 
actors. 
 
The final implication has to do with Russia’s attempts at establishing a 
permanent military presence in the region. At the beginning of the period, 
President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that Russia did not have the 
resources or capabilities of maintaining military bases in the area any 
longer. Following Russia’s isolation in 2014, Russia seems to have reversed 
that course and is intent on projecting capabilities. Their announcement of 
permanent nuclear bombing missions, increase in naval activities, and 
declaration of intent to return to Latin America supports these intents. 
Negotiations for access to strategic ports, airfields, and placement of 
equipment also indicate how serious Russia is at this goal. Technology has 
also increased, allowing Russia new opportunities for its military assets 
and possible missions of spying on the United States. These maneuvers 
and negotiations also work to project power in the American sphere of 
influence, just as the United States does in Russia’s sphere of influence, to 
state that, as United Nations Secretary General Antonio Gutteres stated, 
“The Cold War is back — with a vengeance.”93 
 
Conclusion 
 
Why should the United States be concerned about a greater Russian 
presence in Latin America? The data shows that bilateral trade with 
countries in the region is still in American favor. However, these countries 
also have a historic distrust of the United States and “Yankee 
imperialism”. This culminated in a series of violent conflicts that acted as 
flashpoints in the 20th Century when the Soviet Union was supporting 
these countries. Today, there are different circumstances. While the 
United States and Russia appears to square off once again in a Cold War, 
the United States is also facing an immigration issue from Latin America. 
President Trump has declared a national emergency at the U.S.’ southern 
border and the influx of illegal immigration (particularly from Central and 
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South America) have spurred this declaration.94 This additional facet 
threatens to deteriorate American relations with Latin America further. 
The President’s rhetoric during his tenure has not been favorable towards 
the region. The additional crisis in Venezuela is also causing a stir in the 
region, with these countries divided on supporting Guaido (whom the 
United States supports) and Maduro (whom Russia supports). It also 
threatens to reanimate a history of American led coups in Central and 
South America during the 20th Century when the Soviet Union was looking 
to spread Communism in the Western Hemisphere.  
 
These fears would be substantiated for the governments of these countries, 
but also may lead them to reconsider their current trade stances, which 
still favor the United States. There is also the question of Mexico, which 
would also act as a flashpoint. Russian meddling on the southern border of 
the United States may have affects that spill over directly into the 
American economy as it the Mexican economy has been intertwined with 
that of the United States since 1994. Finally, the issue of port access and 
positioning of intelligence assets closer to American borders should be a 
matter of concern. If done correctly, then Kortunov may be onto 
something with Russian improvements in soft power to accompany its 
hard power projection, which may once again prove a grave threat to the 
United States in its traditional sphere of influence. 
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